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The Public and Private Dichotomy in Coetzee’s Disgrace 
 
These are puritanical times. Private life is public business. 
Prurience is respectable, prurience and sentiment. They wanted a 
spectacle: breast-beating, remorse, tears if possible. A TV show, in 
fact. I wouldn't oblige. (Disgrace, 66) 
 
This passage in which the protagonist, David Lurie, boldly rejects the 
cyclical nature of state intrusion into private lives -- from Puritan times to 
twentieth- century post-apartheid South Africa -- is pivotal in shaping the central 
characters in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. David’s argument is presented here to 
counter an academic committee’s public interrogation into what he thinks ought 
to be a private matter, his sexual relations with a student. Lurie scoffs at the 
widely publicized disciplinary hearings, refuses to defend himself in basic ways, 
and flouts the committee’s request. He muses that: “these are puritanical times. 
Private life is public business” (66).  His recalcitrance and unwillingness to adapt 
to new realities is Coetzee’s portrayal of a false sense of entitlement that David, 
and the former ruling class he represents, possesses. By analogy, Coetzee’s 
depiction similarly indicts an evolutionary post-apartheid South Africa that 
wrestles with political change in the historical context of powerful elites and a 
subjugated majority. 
  Disgrace includes two harrowing stories: The campus novel in which 
David Lurie, a Professor at Cape Town University, has an affair with one of his 
students, Melanie – privately he calls her Meláni, the dark one (18) – and is 
denounced before a committee of inquiry; and the anti-pastoral novel, where his 
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grown daughter, Lucy, lives on a small farm in the Eastern Cape, where she runs a 
kennel for dogs and sells vegetables and flowers from her garden at a weekly 
market. Both become victims to three centuries of colonial violence when they are 
attacked. 
Through historical fiction, Disgrace demonstrates that personal actions 
have political significance. Coetzee also exposes the need to embrace the liberal, 
feminist ideological legacy – “the personal is political, the political is personal” – 
by tapping into the deeper psychological attributes of complex human 
relationships with interlocking issues of retribution, state-sponsored justice, and 
private justice. His leading man displays hunger for the truth and consolation and 
also discovers the deeper tension there. The spirit of new political realities and 
upheaval of centuries of white domination in South Africa blows at full speed 
through the Luries (David and Lucy). Testimony, truth telling and apology are 
stifled and displaced for these central characters, but more so for David, who 
rejects public debasement. 
Coetzee largely examines the conceptualization of the public and private 
domain as an interrelated system of social relations rather than as two largely 
separate spheres of existence and finds that while the public and private sides of 
man seems to be divergent, if understood properly, they are complementary. 
Therefore, the definition of his characters’ identities is wrought with contradictory 
impulses that mirror socio- cultural and political tensions through which the South 
African nation has evolved. A cursory look at all these tensions suggests that one 
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is always looking at the dichotomy through a moving prism, with its lines not 
clear-cut but refracted according to time and circumstance. In the end, Coetzee 
leans towards discrediting the public sphere, yet he deliberately pits the ethical/ 
private sphere against the political/ public sphere, intimating that personal choices 
are intrinsically political.  
Coetzee dissects this complex, dichotomous debate and stages it in a 
number of ways: with David’s relationships with women, especially Soraya and 
Melanie; within David’s consciousness as he comes to terms with his personal yet 
public disgrace through Lucy’s attack; in David’s confession to Mr. Isaacs; and in 
the wider socio-political conditions of a transitional, post-apartheid South Africa. 
Moreover, Coetzee expertly negotiates this ambiguity by juxtaposing conflicting 
perspectives to enable an imaginative representation of the unique subjective 
experiences and responses of multiple characters as they struggle with the 
historical and social processes that violently shape their lives. 
Set at the turn-of-the-millennium when South Africa is flirting with social 
collapse, Disgrace is a complex exploration of the collision of private and public 
worlds. Although the author keeps the focalization1 confined to David – the 
novel’s white, middle-aged and decidedly washed-up academic protagonist – 
there are glimpses into the other characters that illustrate the fluctuating distance 
between their interpretations and responses to events in the exploration of the 
                                                           
1 For a more general evaluation of focalization, see Rimmon-Kenan’s Narrative Fiction, in which she writes that 
focalization occurs when “[t]he story is presented in the text through the mediation of some ‘prism,’ ‘perspective,’ ‘angle 
of vision,’ verbalized by the narrator though not necessarily his” (73). The term “focalization” dispels some of the 
confusion between perspective and narration when terms like “point of view” are used because “focalization” more 
explicitly broadens visual sense to include “cognitive, emotive, and ideological orientation” (73). 
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relationship between the self and society. For instance, David sexually exploits 
his student, Melanie Isaacs, has sex with Soraya, a prostitute, and is openly 
interrogated by a school review committee, but he refuses to publicly confess. 
Later though, in his subsequent apology, “on his knees and touching his forehead 
to the floor, before the mother and sister of his former student” (173), David 
appears to offer some degree of public confession. Additionally, Lucy is 
subjugated to sexual violence, but insists on not dealing with it openly.  
These varied interpretations tend to move toward a collapse of the private 
/public, personal/political binary that preoccupies Coetzee’s literary art. The 
“private lives” of the citizens are invaded by the “public domain” as the 
ramifications of apartheid-era state violence penetrate private spaces in post-
apartheid South Africa: The obscure spatial conception that the author conjures 
here points to the impracticality of clear-cut divisions between “private” and 
“public” space and the inescapability of South Africa’s political history as it 
touches lives. 
The first challenge is played out in the beginning of the novel, where 
David seems to control “the problem of sex” (1) very well through his trysts with 
the “exotic” prostitute Soraya, whom he does find “entirely satisfactorily” (1). 
The poised, controlled hero marks his love life with cold logic: “intercourse 
between Soraya and himself, must be he imagines, rather like the copulation of 
snakes: lengthy, absorbed, but rather abstract, rather dry, even at its hottest” (2-3). 
Although he gives readers the impression that he has power over his love life, the 
animal imagery indicates that David is driven by innate, animalistic desires which 
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he does not manage well. At the outset, David is totally self absorbed and 
intellectually arrogant. His solution is therefore routinely reducing women to 
objects with which he gratifies his desires. This [dis]satisfaction (emphasis mine) 
mostly rotates between the “exotic” Soraya and later, the “dark-one”, Melanie.  
His arrangement with the prostitute threatens to fall apart because “one 
Saturday morning everything changes …. the memory [of Soraya in the street 
with her sons] hangs uneasily over them” (6). Lurie however, cannot accept it: it 
was an arrangement that worked, and the alternatives do not satisfy him. He 
convinces himself that “he has no wish to upset, what must be for Soraya, a 
precarious double life” (6), but is helpless in probing her secret further. “Though 
Soraya still keeps her appointments, he feels a growing coolness as she transforms 
herself into just another woman and him into just another client” (7). After she 
ends her private, business arrangement, David intrudes on that space by hiring a 
private detective to track her whereabouts. Soraya takes control of her privacy and 
handles the permissible parameters of their relationship. “‘I don’t know who you 
are, she says. You are harassing me in my own house. I demand that you will 
never phone me here again, never’” (9-10).  This becomes the first real signal that 
David is losing that grip of control of his life, his affairs, and others’ perception of 
him. 
Themes of voyeurism and intrusion keep emerging in the novel and are 
directly related to who remains on the outside/inside, and at what critical moment. 
David deliberately blurs discursive boundaries of his career, art, and family 
because “Professor Lurie is all for double lives, triple lives, lives lived in 
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compartments" (6). Soraya, like David, is guilty of compartmentalization, and for 
this reason David becomes a voyeur as he tries to become an “insider” in her 
private, family affairs. The prostitute and maternal roles are clearly segregated, 
and as such, “of her life outside Windsor Mansions, Soraya reveals nothing'' (3). 
She fiercely protects her private space (home) and shares with David only her 
escort services, which she clearly distinguishes in terms of space, time, goods, and 
payment. David refuses to accept this and proceeds to tread on her personal space. 
Indeed, this is the first instance where he is denied focalization – a denial that not 
only restricts his access but also his mobility. 
Coetzee suggests that David’s sexuality is linked to a sense of authority 
and entitlement. As his privileged, bourgeoisie position at Cape Town University 
is “rationalized” and his sexual encounters with Soraya cease, he considers 
himself emasculated: he “ought to give up, retire from the game” (9). Thus his 
loss of intellectual authority is paralleled with the loss of sexual gratification. As 
he suffers intellectual castration in the “emasculated institution of learning,” (4) 
there is no other appropriate end. 
When the sexual encounters with Soraya end, he moves on to impose 
himself on his student, Melanie Isaacs. Their interactions are laced with tensions. 
First, she is a student, and as her professor, David has certain professional 
responsibilities. Second, David refers to her privately as the “dark one”, but there 
is no clear indication about her ethnicity. Subsequently, it is difficult to 
thoroughly analyze their relationship through a racialized lens. The very reference 
of the word “dark”,  however, and the former white ruling class to which David 
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belongs, make a plausible case that his sexual encounters with Melanie include 
issues of race, class, and power.   
As already indicated, Disgrace opens with a discussion of David’s rather 
aggressive sexual behavior and reveals his history of desiring “exotic” women (in 
fact, he selects Soraya, a prostitute, because she is labeled as “exotic” in a 
catalog). David is immediately characterized as a man who assumes that he has 
the right to possess (or purchase) women’s bodies without responsibility towards 
them or respect for their lives2, as Lucy Graham notes. Later, while David admits 
that he must “detain” (19) the unwilling, unresponsive Melanie in order to “thrust 
himself upon” her (24) because sex with him is “undesired to the core” (25) of her 
being, he continues to insist that it was “not rape, not quite that” (25). Indeed, he 
claims that his having (forced) sexual intercourse with her does not constitute rape 
because “[s] he does not own herself” (16). When he asks Melanie to spend the 
night, he convinces her and himself that, “a woman’s beauty does not belong to 
her alone. It is part of the bounty she brings into the world. She has a duty to share 
it” (16).  This is typical of the master/slave discourse and evident in the post- 
imperialistic project that Coetzee expounds. 
Rob Nixon identifies the socio-historical colonial, social and legal 
structures in which women were “ordinarily institutionalized as male property” 
(77). Rape is more blatantly utilized as a tool of colonial repression, or what 
                                                           
2 Lucy Graham illuminates the issue of rape in Disgrace. She points to “a poster for the New 
National Party before the 1999 elections” that “states that women are raped daily, that the party is 
‘deeply shocked’ at the ANC’s ‘unfeeling’ attitude, and that the new Nationalist [sic] Party plans 
to institute capital punishment for rapists” (435). See Bakker (FP), election advertisement for The 
New National Party, 1999 elections. 
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Nixon deems “a war of dispossession… a male war” (77). In the crossfire of such 
a war, Nixon claims, “women find themselves unenviably cast as first-class icons 
but second-class citizens. They are denied the arms to defend themselves while 
are weighed down with symbolic responsibilities as guarantors of homeland, 
ethnos, and lineage” (77). Rape, in such circumstances, is used not only to torture 
women, but is also aimed at men (as David will later discover) and the collapse of 
the familial structures of the “enemy.” In allowing David’s inability to think of his 
assault on Melanie as “rape” and his utter incomprehension of the reasons behind 
the corrective measures against his behavior, Coetzee argues that the racialized 
conceptions of rape in colonial and apartheid South Africa continue to structure 
the discourse surrounding rape and its legal treatment in the post-apartheid state. 
A transformed country then, the author reiterates, does not necessarily equate to 
transformed attitudes about private/public selves. 
But David’s arrogance, based in part on intellectual notions and 
philosophical abstractions and in part on his temperament, fortifies his belief that 
his actions with Melanie are justified and authorized. Instead of “retiring from the 
game” David, as a “servant of Eros,” (52) imposes “his rights of desire” (89) on 
Melanie. Yet, before he forces himself on her, there is a tension between the 
intellectual and physical sensations he experiences. He acknowledges that it is 
“not rape, not quite, but undesired to the core” (25). Here, David is almost a 
sympathetic character because at times he seems to be aware of his own guilt and 
issues of morality. He retreats into a private confessional mode, albeit 
momentarily, but he is unable to deny his desire for a younger woman. He reflects 
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that, “he ought to let her go” (18), but being the true Romantic that he is, he 
believes “that a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone…she has a duty to 
share it” (16). When the voice of reason and the system of conscience interject, 
Coetzee illustrates that his antihero knows these actions are immoral: “a child he 
thinks, no more than a child! What am I doing? Yet, his heart launches with 
desires” (20). Paradoxically, the protagonist falls from grace and ultimately to 
“disgrace” because of his paralysis in questioning the “authority” that is 
embedded in desire and his inability to recognize that he is driven not by that 
authority, but by his bodily instincts.  
Arguably, readers glean that this would probably become a fatal flaw for 
David. Steeped in Romantic traditions, he explicates the Alpine sequence in 
Wordsworth’s The Prelude for his students. Although David’s linguistic approach 
to the distinction between “usurp” and “usurp upon” (20) alienates his students, 
Coetzee uses this symbolic frame to profile his protagonist’s personality and 
temperament. “As long as David can remember, “the harmonies of The Prelude 
have echoed within him” (20). Thus the discussion of Wordsworthian 
philosophies reveals the determining core values of David himself. Since to 
“usurp” is to take over entirely and is the perfective of “usurp upon”, which 
means to intrude or encroach upon”(21),  similarly David’s predatory, sexual 
“rights of desire” have, in many ways, “usurped upon” Melanie’s private self and 
her “rights” to reject his “desires.” It is this false sense of privilege and self-
consciousness that allows David, for example, to speak for Soraya and later to 
demand that Melanie and his daughter, Lucy, find their voices.  
10 
 
David’s sexual politics resonate, to an extent, through Michel Foucault's 
ideas on sexuality. Foucault's universal principle3 on the prohibition of such 
sexuality is what David intensely struggles with. Before he 'usurps' and invades 
Melanie’s' personal, sexual space, he thinks to himself that she is a mere child. In 
what seems like a lover/father role, David tries to make her “tell Daddy what is 
wrong" (26) when she cries uncontrollably after their sexual encounter. He 
conflates the lover/father role further. In a parental tone, he muses to himself 
about Melanie: “She is behaving badly, getting away with too much” (28). When 
wooing Melanie, “the voice he hears belongs to a cajoling parent, not a lover” 
(20).  
Yet David is imperceptive in recognizing his flirtation with separating 
spheres. Synonymous with Foucault’s ideas on incest, he struggles with the 
father/lover role when Melanie asks to spend the night. Although there is no 
suggestion that he wants to sleep with his own biological daughter, his 
willingness to flirt and play out the prohibited incestuous fetish is significant and 
firmly rooted in Foucault. Coetzee portrays this very well in the very site of 
Lurie’s sexual tryst with his student: “He makes up a bed for her in his daughter’s 
                                                           
3 See Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction for a comprehensive 
discussion about sexual philosophy and its impact on punishment. This dilemma and in many 
ways, David’s sexual rights philosophy (albeit his life philosophy) can be understood in the 
context of Foucault’s work on sexuality, discipline and punishment. The philosopher creates a 
model to understand one’s body and its place in private and public discourses as well how modern 
prisons as bureaucratic institutions shifted focus on punishment from the perpetrator’s body to his 
soul. In Foucault’s History, punishment, family, power, and confession are the core of  the 
public/private divide. These are all salient issues that shape and reshape David’s life, and are 
integral to Foucault’s theorizing of society’s “hypocritical sexuality”. As such, in many ways, 
David is a Foucauldean character.  
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old room, kisses her goodnight… eases off her shoes, covers her… [Asks 
himself], Mistress? Daughter? What in her heart is she trying to be? What is she 
offering him? … He makes love to her one more time, on the bed in his 
daughter’s room” (26-9). As a result, Coetzee, the author and commentator, 
shapes a Foucauldean character, one in which, David, a member of the modern, 
bourgeoisie family, both creates and negates his own incestuous desires, 
reproducing them through the restraint of incestuous feeling. 
Further undertones of private, sexual divergence with the public, state 
apparatus are made even more problematic with gendered and racial discourse of 
the colonized past that David represents. During David’s disciplinary hearing, one 
committee member begins to point to the connections between David’s behavior 
and the colonial conditions that once authorized it by saying, “when we try to get 
specificity, all of a sudden it is not abuse of a young woman he is confessing to, 
just an impulse he could not resist, with no mention of the pain he has caused, no 
mention of the long history of exploitation of which this is a part” (53). Ann 
Stoler argues that this is an exploitation that traces back to an era of South African 
history in which “sexual abuse of black women was not classified as rape and 
therefore was not legally actionable, nor did rapes committed by white men lead 
to prosecution” ( “Making Empire” 353). Stoler further asserts that, “the rhetoric 
of sexual assault and the measures used to prevent it had virtually no correlation 
with the incidence of rape of European women by men of color. Just the contrary: 
there was often no evidence, ex post facto or at the time, that rapes were 
committed or that rape attempts were made. This is not to suggest that sexual 
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assaults never occurred, but that their incidence had little to do with the 
fluctuations in anxiety about them” (353).  
Readers are led to believe that David is already satiated with sex since he 
knows how to "solve the problem of sex" (1) and since "sex is the backbone of his 
life" (7). However it permeates his being and is resistant to the intensive judicial 
and administrative vehicles designed to control it. As the novel's anti-hero, David 
seems to demonstrate a keen awareness that "power represses sex" (Foucault, 
History 85), whether that power is internal (private) or external (public).  Hence, 
he views the state machinery (academic committee) as a means to control his 
servitude to Eros -- an issue he persistently expresses as private. But as David 
switches from perpetrator to victim, he will later grudgingly acknowledge 
Foucault's assertion that, "sex is seen as a cause of any and everything" (History 
65).  If this is such a pervasive problem for David, and the lives that he touches, 
then in a Foucauldean twist, sexual [mis]conduct will require "the direction of 
consciences, the self examination" (Foucault 120), especially among members of 
the educated class – David's class. Consequently, punishment must be 
administered through private and public means, a fact that David refuses to admit 
at this point in his reformation.  
Although David is conscious of his shame and guilt, Coetzee skillfully 
integrates moral ambiguity within his soul in a way that intertwines repulsive 
action with that of a “public” confession. Here, Coetzee challenges his 
protagonist’s assumption of individual autonomy and the careless freedom with 
which it provides him the idea of excusing those actions with confessions. The 
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challenge is played out before an academic “committee of inquiry” (48). David 
admits guilt but refuses to publicly repent and demonstrate remorse. While it is a 
turning point in David’s trajectory, it is an incomplete process because he has not 
yet surrendered self and the desires within. The interrogation (inquisition) does 
not culminate in a dismissal because the committee has “no power to take 
decisions” (48), but it establishes its ethical necessity as the catalyst to push David 
into self-imposed exile. 
The scene of interrogation, in which the faculty committee indignantly 
objects to Lurie’s ‘acceptance of charges’ without remorse, initiates the novel’s 
exploratory work on the ethical and juridical quandaries. David rejects such quasi-
judicial arrangement and questions the efficacy of both confession and the 
spectacle of deliberation: “I am sure the members of this committee have better 
things to do with their time than rehash a story over which there will be no 
dispute’,  responds Lurie to his colleagues. ‘I plead guilty to both charges. Pass 
sentence, and let us get on with our lives” (48-9). Responding to David, his 
perspective, and his refusal to acquiesce to ethical responsibility and moral 
culpability, Dr Rassool protests: 
Prof Lurie says he accepts the charges. Yet when we try to pin him 
down on what it is that he actually accepts, all we get is subtle mockery. 
To me that suggests that he accepts the charges only in name. […] 
Professor Lurie pleads guilty, but I ask myself, does he accept his guilt or 
is he simply going through the motions in the hope that the case will be 
buried under paper and forgotten? (50-1) 
 
Ironically, at this point, David and Dr Rassool seem to both lack clarity about the 
definition of accepting the charges but have converging views that public 
confession is a sham unless there is deliberative reason and sincerity. The major 
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difference here is that David tries to dodge a literal conceptualization of justice 
while Dr Rassool demands performative justice. But David takes it a step further; 
he later contemplates that: “I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, 
before a branch of the law. Before that secular tribunal, I pleaded guilty, a secular 
plea. That plea should suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance 
belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse” (58). Therefore, moral 
issues of confession and repentance demand a visceral transformation of attitude, 
emotions and instincts in the private body itself. Woefully though, this primal 
transformation cannot be objectively measured in a public/legalistic framework, 
and as such, it is a farce.  
Again, issues of intrusion surface. Dr Rassool, symbolic of the 
bureaucracy, wants access not only to David’s body but also to the inner sanctum 
of his soul. By whatever means necessary, the public machinations will delve 
deeply to intrude in that private space in a way that reflects the intrusion that 
David inflicts on Melanie. This ‘state-censored’ invasion justifies its right to 
extract truth even by force, and at the expense of pillaging the personal soul. 
Rassool’s interrogation dramatizes “the potentially dangerous, invasive discipline 
or even torturous nature of inquiry - by his preferring punishment over 
participating in the inquiry, [David] tacitly contends that the interrogation itself is 
more punitive than the penalty” (Saunders 104). Here is the real danger of state 
intrusion in private life -- the dualism results in ‘disgraceful’ coexistence or 
intimacies.  
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David uses privacy as his defense in his “public spectacle” before the 
committee, but if this theory is traced to its philosophical roots, his defense is 
flawed and incomplete. The legislative view that there is a divisive threshold 
between public and private grounds is most dramatically illustrated by the sexual 
harassment and is also generally proscribed although it is not subsumed within the 
political/private life dichotomy.  
Nevertheless, sexual harassment is rendered unlawful only in particular 
circumstances within the market, most notably in employment and education; 
harassment in the street, a public place, is not proscribed. Inferentially, this is a 
'private' activity, which is of no interest to the state. 'Private', according to the 
Victorian legislative schema, purports to relate to an individual's interior life. 
However, a complaint of discrimination can arise only when religious or political 
belief manifests itself in some way within the legislative ambit, that is, when it 
pertains to certain aspects of public life. Over time however, the lines between 
private sexual encounters and public life have been blurred and have become 
reactive to socio-historical and political forces.4 Privacy then, is the conduit 
through which one can freely define one’s relationship with others, as well as to 
                                                           
4 Today, the debate over the definition of privacy remains fierce. While early treatises see the 
concept largely from a moral perspective, other critiques have varied implications. Judith 
Thomson in her work, “The Right to Privacy” elaborates, for example, that other interests can 
often usurp privacy, so the right to privacy has no special place. Richard Posner sees the principle 
operating through defective economic principles while Robert Bork contends that there is 
inadequate legal doctrine to make it grounded. From a feminist’s perspective, Catherine 
MacKinnon argues that specialized privacy granted on the basis of gender facilitates threats, 
control, and abuse. Ultimately, these different lenses respond to socio-economic and political 
dynamism. 
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define one’s self. Moreover, it is this privacy that allows one’s personality and 
inner self to flourish.  
Coetzee frames David’s defense about sex with Melanie as a private 
matter to allow readers to extract the truth: as all political fictions show, there is 
no absolute privacy. Over time, based on the felt necessities of the time, the state 
intrudes on the private self. Implicit in this idea of privacy is its connection to 
one’s behavior and regulation of activities. Coetzee illustrates this fluidity mostly 
through readers’ interaction with David and Lucy’s transformation. Privacy 
accords them the ability to control what is known about them and who has that 
access to them --- insiders --- thereby controlling and maintaining their social 
relationships. 
 Coetzee’s protagonist’s expulsion from the university results in a loss of 
relative social privilege and entitlement. This loss of position sets him off on a 
line of flight that eventually leads to the deterritorialization of his personal, social, 
professional and intellectual world. He would rather retreat to his daughter Lucy’s 
“small town” farm in Salem than accept moral culpability and public confession. 
Soon after his arrival, he discovers that in this rural community, the rules of the 
game are different. Lucy is gang raped by three black men, and he is robbed and 
assaulted, thereby instigating Lurie’s attitudinal reversal towards individual/ 
private rights, based on the notion of legal redress. Most importantly, the attack 
crystallizes, especially for David, that sex is not about the act or the desire but 
about power. Lucy later describes it as an act of “[s]ubjection. Subjugation” 
(159).  
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 Lucy’s rights-based theories similarly undergo transformation when her 
private home is invaded by the public, political ramifications of retributive 
violence, but in the opposite direction from her father. She censures Lurie about 
“standing up for himself” shortly after his arrival on the farm, whereas after she is 
attacked, she refuses to submit her rape to the scrutiny of any legal authority. 
Tension arises between Lucy and David when Lucy refuses to report her rape to 
the police. David sees her silence as a capitulation: “[s]he would rather hide her 
face, and he knows why. Because of the disgrace. Because of the shame. That is 
what their visitors have achieved; that is what they have done to this confident 
young woman” (115). In this version of events, the three perpetrators become the 
owners of the story of Lucy’s rape, which in turn becomes the story of “[h]ow 
they put her in her place, how they showed her what a woman was for” (115). 
However, Lucy’s speechlessness in Disgrace rejects the kind of 
canonization that comingles public with private in a linear way, and her silence 
becomes what Benita Parry5 refers to as “that portentous silence signifying what 
cannot be spoken” (45). She insists that her rape is “a purely private matter. In 
another time, in another place it might be held to be a public matter. But in this 
place, at this time, it is not” (112). Lucy’s decision to not report her rape to the 
police attempts to disentangle her rape from the black peril narrative, which 
David frames. Lucy’s claim that her experience belongs in the private sphere 
                                                           
5 Benita Parry. “Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J.M. Coetzee.” Critical Perspectives on 
J.M.Coetzee.  Ed. Graham Huggan and Stephen Watson. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 
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prevents its public appropriation as a crime that can be projected onto an entire 
black community, characterized by white officials as monolithic for political ends. 
Her preemptive decision later proves warranted; Grahamstown’s white police 
officers arrest the wrong men for the theft of David’s car, having caught the first 
group of black men that the unit came across (emphasis mine). In this chain of 
events, white South African officials view black men as a mass, individually 
interchangeable. Her “rights of desire” therefore are limited in her refusal to 
submit her violation to the law and its inability to safeguard her from its intrusive 
scrutiny.  
Drawing on one of Disgrace’s conceptualizations of individual rights, 
Lucy claims the freedom and the right to act on her desire of not being “put on 
trial like this, not to have to justify myself” (133). Lucy explains to her father:  
The reason is that, as far as I am concerned, what happened to me 
is a purely private matter. In another time, in another place it might 
be held in a public matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It 
is my business, mine alone… (112).  
 
Lucy’s assertion that her injury is a “private matter” rather than one that should 
benefit from “public” gaze is crucial because it also shields her experience from a 
moralizing gaze. Furthermore, it depicts the ambiguous nature of the public and 
private spheres. But of course, Lucy is aware that the attack was also 
fundamentally impersonal (that is, political) and that her response to it, whatever 
it might be, has no option but to be public and political. She seems determined 
nevertheless to come as close as possible to removing herself from the public 
sphere, aware as she is of the reality that to press charges is to enter into a national 
phenomenon and debate concerning the cycle of black-on-white violence. 
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Moreover, she is aware that the historical contingencies of her situation warrant 
and demand her privacy: 
In another time, in another place it might be held to be a public 
matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It is my business, 
mine alone. 
This place being what? 
This place being South Africa. (112) 
 
However, it’s not as though simply accepting the situation avoids an entanglement 
with those same politics. The irony is that by avoiding one sphere (private), Lucy 
inadvertently and consciously makes a decision in the other sphere (political). 
That’s what Lucy means when she says that what happened to her is a purely 
private matter: she can only treat it as private; or else the consequences to her 
ethical and political self-image will be disastrous. “I must make the political 
decision,” she is saying, “to treat this as a nonpolitical matter.” 
Analogously, Lucy has clearly accepted the political transformation in the 
post-apartheid South Africa. The new realities in South Africa are ones that 
engender violence and revenge; therefore, Lucy’s role here is to halt the fueling of 
inter-racial animosity of the sort systemized under apartheid. Her father poses a 
question and rebukes her this way: “do you think that you can expiate the crime of 
the past by suffering in the present?” (112) Lucy’s response suggests that she has 
embraced the political realities instead of the intellectual abstractions her father 
associates with issues of “guilt and salvation” (112). On the other hand, David is 
still in the process of coming to terms with this. Later still, however, Lucy 
confesses that she was baffled and shaken by exactly the personal investment of 
her attackers: “It was done with such personal hatred. That was what stunned me 
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more than anything. The rest was … expected. But why did they hate me so? I 
had never set eyes on them” (156).  It is in response to this question, in an attempt 
at palliation, that David offers his poignant hypothesis that “it was history 
speaking through them … it may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t” (156).  
Here it could be argued that when hatred is so personal, the way to deal 
with it must be personal, too; when the injury is so personal, the agency that can 
counter it must inevitably be personal. To turn to the police, to what Judith Butler 
calls the “state-sponsored censorship” (41) of acts of hatred, would be to run away 
from the limited responsibility one carries in whichever socio-historical context 
one functions in. Such an act of escape runs the risk of taking the subject into a 
realm of philosophical abstractions, where all responsibility becomes absolute in 
that it can only be referred to an authority capable of deciding rights and wrongs. 
It runs the risk of what Butler sees as “an intervention in which agency is fully 
assumed by the state,” an assumption of power that she is deeply suspicious of 
(41).  
Most importantly, Lucy crucially chooses this interdependent way of life. 
There were alternatives available to her: turning to a prosecuting authority (the 
Law, her father), having an abortion, and moving away. Nevertheless, she opts for 
a form of moving on with her life that accepts the limited responsibility each of 
the actors carries in the drama that has occurred. The question now arises: is this a 
risky move for Lucy? Does her bridled mouth evoke a sense of passivity, 
complacency, sympathy, or adoration? Coetzee shapes it as a powerful 
amalgamation of all. 
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Several literary critics, such as Michael Gorra and Andrew O’Heir,6 argue 
that Lucy accepts her humiliation and decides to live further in "disgrace". In the 
following passage on Lucy’s acquiescence, their views seem to apply:  
Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to 
start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To 
start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With 
nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity. 
Like a dog.                                                                                                                                     
Yes, like a dog. (205)  
     
Gorra believes that this is not necessarily a sign of passivity or victimization, but 
rather that Lucy’s acceptance signals strength. He asserts that, "[t]he daughter is 
marked by an integrity that her father knows he cannot claim for himself." He 
rejects that this is all hopeless, and concludes that the lives of the characters 
"remain unresolved and unfinished, their problems and possibilities still open" 
(New York Times). Lowry7 assents and thinks that a comprehensive analysis of the 
novel should not negate its twisted plot that surrounds "a sexually predatory father 
and an isolated, self-sufficient daughter who is raped by a black neighbor and 
submits to further sexual contact in the hope that this will bring her in the 
community with her rapist" (The London Review of Books Online, 5). Thus from 
her post-colonial reading of the text, it is evident that Disgrace shows the victory 
of one expansionist over another and it leaves Lucy silent, without a voice.  
                                                           
6 Michael Gorra."After the Fall" in The New York Times. 28/11/1999 and Andrew 
O’Hehir."Disgrace” in Salon Books. <www.salon.com/books/review/1999/11/o5/coetzee/>. 
11/02/10.    
7 Elisabeth Lowry. "Like a Dog", in The London Review of Books online, vol 21, no 20 (cover date 
14/10/1999) 
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While these are all plausible analyses, it is important to note that 
differences in gender, ethnicity, social power and historical circumstances will 
affect the lives of characters and what they represent. Marginalized voices will at 
times appear mute to complicate the prevailing, aesthetic values of their time. 
Against this background, Lucy’s unspoken didacticism strongly relates to the 
Darwinian concept of survival. By not directly accepting the public/political 
avenues of remedy open to her, she is assimilating deeper into the new South 
African reality. This has little to do with self-doubt and fear and is more related to 
acceptance of a new phase of history – one in which private matters are 
subordinated to public ones. Clearly, if she wants to remain in the new South 
Africa, there are not many options; therefore, she engages in economic exchange 
and forms a pact with Petrus -- the one who instigates her rape. She notes with 
conformity that, “[h]e is offering me an alliance, a deal. I contribute the land, in 
return for which I am allowed to creep in under his wing. Otherwise, he wants to 
remind me, I am without protection, I am fair game” (203). This uneasy pact 
affords her the ability to assert her own private independence because the public 
apparatus offers little remedy to this cycle of violence that will only become 
progressively worse. In any social structure, one’s resourcefulness is the key to 
keeping alive? Lucy’s greatest strength then is utilizing the resource of her 
silence. 
Unlike her father Lucy, however, does not let her liberal, individual rights 
make an impact on the political machinations of the present. She chooses not to 
engage in ideological or hand to hand combat. After her sexual violation, she 
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reminisces about “this place” (112). In her only unprompted discussion of the 
attack with David, she understands that “in this place, at this time, it is not [a 
public issue]…This place being South Africa” (112). What may be interpreted as 
a disconnection from the space that creates identity construction can also be 
viewed as the site of Lucy’s identity re- construction. Her disgrace thrusts her to 
forge economic co-operation with Petrus, the black agent provocateur. As is the 
case with most members of the former ruling class, there is a major power 
reversal; Lucy’s last resort becomes Petrus’ new beginning. The once outcast and 
landless Petrus becomes the owning class. The transgressions of the white past 
and the disgrace of state-sanctioned injustice via apartheid become ominous for 
Disgrace. Like the temporary advantage Lucy’s alliance with Petrus gives her, 
post- apartheid South Africa has no guaranteed assurances. 
In the sharp contrast between the way that Melanie’s rape is treated in 
David’s narrative and his reaction to Lucy’s rape, Coetzee calculatingly brings 
these tensions between the personal and political bodies to the forefront of his 
postcolonial novel. Just after the robbery and assault on Lucy’s farm, David 
ponders Lucy’s rape as a piece of “a vast circulatory system, to whose workings 
pity and terror are irrelevant. That is how one must see life in this country: in its 
schematic aspect. Otherwise one could go mad. Cars, shoes; women too” (98). 
David sees Lucy’s rape as a political and social problem, closely tied to history, 
racially charged. His claim that her rape is “Lucy’s secret; his disgrace” (109), 
and his juxtaposition of women alongside shoes and cars as objects that can be 
taken or stolen suggests that the rape of a white woman is in some way an attack 
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on white men and their privileged self as well. Whereas earlier he deplored the 
public’s condemnation of his own wrongdoing and his rights to “remain silent” 
(188), he embraces the law’s function and asserts that “I am Lucy’s father. I want 
those men to be caught and brought before the law and punished” (119).  
Lurie’s dichotomizing of the law becomes more evident as he goes 
through a role reversal from perpetrator to victim. He swiftly inverts his opinion 
and demands the public contrition of Lucy’s rapists because he concludes that he 
is not “wrong to want justice” (119). In an ironic twist, Lurie pursues the very 
performance of public penitence he had scorned earlier. Lurie possesses an 
extraordinary capacity for self-serving interpretations of his own actions and those 
of others. Hence, this dichotomous relationship with the law is self-serving and, 
as Coetzee postulates, offers comfort and remedy for those wholly within the 
legal circumference. He comes full circle and once again operates as an outsider.  
In a marginalized position, Lurie’s vicissitudes occur after his own 
experience of dispossession. While it is not clear whether David’s sexual 
misdemeanors represent a foil to his daughter’s brutal rape, David himself 
understands that the perpetrators are responding to the “history of wrong” (156) 
their ancestors bore. This runs equivalent to his former Department Chair’s 
acceptance that, “the hangover from the past, the sooner cleared away the better” 
(40). 
But David’s ‘problem of sex’ is at a crucial interaction with Coetzee’s 
ironical, rhetorical strategy. The author employs this strategy to consistently 
undermine David’s focalization and to render his versions of events completely 
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unreliable during and after Lucy’s rape. Gayatri Spivak8 calls it the ability for 
readers to ‘counterfocalize’. She contends that after the move from offender to 
victim:  
the reader is provoked, for he or she does not want to share in 
Lurie-the-chief focalizer's inability to “read” Lucy as patient and 
agent. No reader is content with acting out the failure of reading. 
This is the rhetorical signal to the active reader, to 
counterfocalize…. This provocation into counterfocalization is 
the“political” in political fiction – the transformation of a tendency 
into a crisis. (22) 
 
In an ironic twist, David is also like a voyeur to Lucy’s rape. The attack is 
depicted by the narrator-as-focalized-through-David as part of a larger spate of 
crimes against whites that the authorities are unable to prevent. Much of the novel 
relies on David’s version of events (sometimes unreliable as shown in his 
academic interrogation), but during his daughter’s rape, he is and outsider to the 
physical as well as the psychological experience. In Disgrace’s most controversial 
scene, three black men break into Lucy’s farmhouse, gang-raping her and 
assaulting David. During much of the action, David is locked in the bathroom, 
and the narration of his stream of thought as his daughter is raped is one of the 
more obvious instances of Coetzee’s strategy of subverting David’s perspective: 
 
He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will not 
save him here in darkest Africa. He is helpless, an Aunt Sally, a 
figure from a cartoon, a missionary in cassock and topi waiting 
with clasped hands and upcast eyes while the savages jaw away in 
their own lingo preparatory to plunging him into their boiling 
cauldron. Mission work: what has it left behind, that huge 
enterprise of upliftment? Nothing that he can see. (95) 
                                                           
8 Gayatri, Spivak. “Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching.” 
Diacritics 32.3/4 (2002): 17-31. 
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 This scene evokes many interpretative issues. First, it is clear that these are 
David’s offstage views rather than the views of a more reliable, omniscient third 
person narrator as Coetzee would want readers to believe. Once again, through the 
rhetorical strategies of voyeurism and intrusion, David’s unreliable narrative 
draws attention to the ways in which he silences the “many layers of reality,” and 
thus the very silences of the text become points at which suppressed histories 
enter the plot of the novel.  From a Freudian perspective, Ariella Azoulay argues 
that, “trauma…is given its meaning a second time, only in retroactive fashion 
when it is articulated and told to an addressee” (34-5).  Therefore the audience is 
the “addressee” through whom the re-enactment of the first rape (Melanie) 
becomes more meaningful by Lucy’s vicious attack. Without this explicit trauma, 
the more implicit parallelism to the Melanie’s “not quite rape” may have been 
cast in a shadow. This re-enactment, David’s offstage scene, Azoulay contends, 
becomes the narrative articulation of the first sexual violation. The juxtaposed 
violations involving one white and one non-white victim, as well as, one white 
and some non-white rapists brings into focus a dilemma of identification  posed 
by the author. The third person narrative voice asks David, “Does he have it in 
him to be [a] woman?” (160). This becomes an attempt for him to successfully 
navigate an introspection that leads to a crisis of conscience as he becomes an 
insider into Lucy’s rape and subsequent decisions. 
A historical reference that becomes clearer is the mentioning of Aunt 
Sally, a figure David compares himself to and a figure the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines as “an object of unreasonable or prejudiced attack.” As Anne 
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Longmuir9 and other critics have asserted, “Aunt Sally,” is, then, a racialized 
symbol that was characteristic of “the very male, white hegemony” of colonial 
and apartheid-era South Africa (Longmuir 121). That David, in characterizing 
himself as a victim of the new South Africa, draws on the figure of an older black 
woman publicly abused and humiliated by white men presents a deep irony –  
particularly given his general attitude toward women – that serves to undercut his 
narrative credibility. Moreover, the “images of black violence against whites 
invoked by Lurie are, crucially, images drawn from a white, colonial vision of 
Africa” (Longmuir 120), particularly his reference to Africa as a “dark continent.” 
Indeed, David’s understanding of black South Africans appears to be entirely 
informed by colonial representations, from mission work seen as a “huge 
enterprise of upliftment” (instead of a tool of colonization) to his allusion to the 
cannibalistic savagery that was a staple of nineteenth-century European depictions 
of Africans. 
Furthermore, as the events of the novel unfold, David’s own conception of 
the clear boundaries of identity between himself and the men who rape Lucy 
dissolve. In one scene, David’s identity and that of Lucy’s rapists collapse into 
one another as David imagines his daughter’s rape:  
While the men, for their part, drank up her fear, reveled in it, did all they 
could to hurt her, to menace her, to heighten her terror…. You don’t 
understand, you weren’t there, says Bev Shaw. Well, she is mistaken. 
Lucy’s intuition is right after all: he does understand, he can, if he 
concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill 
them with the ghost of himself. (160) 
 
David can “be there, be the men” who “drank up her fear” in the same way that he 
                                                           
9 Anne Longmuir. “Coetzee’s Disgrace.” The Explicator 65.2 (2007): 119-121. 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“thrusts himself upon [Melanie]” and “takes her” while “her limbs crumple” (24). 
By scripting David as a character who casts himself as a victim in the new 
political order but can also imagine himself in the position of Lucy’s rapists, 
Coetzee destabilizes David’s view of the new South Africa and draws attention to 
the ways in which colonial rape myths continue to structure post-apartheid social 
and political discourse. 
Embedded in Lucy’s silence and beneath the plot of Disgrace is the 
novel’s inscription of racialized rape as something that cannot be spoken publicly 
in the available discourse, and the active reader’s attention to the unspoken allows 
such historical narratives and subtexts to emerge. However, while David elides 
and displaces his acts of sexual exploitation, Coetzee’s language and carefully 
placed silences alert the reader to the parallels between the sexual violations that 
take place in each half of the novel. Melanie and Lucy experience their assaults in 
remarkably similar terms. During David’s “not quite” rape of Melanie, he notes 
that it was “[a]s though she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the 
duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So that 
everything done to her might be done, as it were, far away” (25).  
David’s predatory position in this scene is likened to that of a fox hunting 
a rabbit; later, in remembering the event, David describes Melanie as “[s]tepping 
out in the forest where the wild wolf prowls” (168). Similarly, from an outsider’s 
perspective, David tries to give readers an inside view and calls Lucy’s youngest 
rapist a “jackal boy” (202), and Lucy says, “I am a dead person” (161). In 
constructing these parallels between Melanie’s rape and Lucy’s rape, Coetzee 
29 
 
“scratch[es] beneath the surface of David’s free indirect speech” (Samuelson 144) 
to reveal the profound double standard on which black peril hysteria operated by 
exposing the far more prevalent yet largely unspoken white peril that dominated 
colonial life in the Cape. This absence of an insider’s view not only reveals the 
fluctuating distance between his interpretations and responses to events and 
explores the relationship between the self and society, but also produces a text 
that forms around a void and moves towards a collapse of the private/public, 
personal/political dualism that preoccupies the vast majority of the work. 
Hence, there is neither redemption nor satisfaction for David as he takes 
on these contradictory roles. But this subversion is Coetzee’s most blatant 
authoritative voice because he actively challenges Lurie’s perspective, and by so 
doing, creates a new lens for Lurie to counter his sexual philosophy. If Lucy’s 
attackers appear like barbarous creatures, David is similarly culpable and must 
bear the same name. While this is not a justification of individual malfeasance, it 
is recognition of the dangers of institutional regularization in South Africa -- a 
nation that previously legally codified violence and oppressions of apartheid. 
Here Coetzee critiques the cycle of brutality, judgment, and confession, which are 
all symptoms of retributive violence. 
After the rape, David journeys back to Cape Town as if there is some 
unfinished business. This physical journey is akin to his metaphysical one. The 
process of identity forming or bildung he undergoes in the course of Disgrace 
involves the forfeiture as well as the consolidation of self. This ethical trajectory 
spins from his initial assertion that his violation of others privately “rests on his 
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rights of desires” (89) to his eventual acceptance that his inability to influence the 
endemic violence he encounters with his daughter, means he is “attending to a 
dying enterprise” (121). David complains that during his self-imposed exile in 
rural South Africa, “he came to gather himself, gather his forces, [but] [t]here he 
[was] losing himself day by day” (121). This seems to negate the suggestion of 
fortification before, but Coetzee implies that individual (micro) needs to be 
submerged in order for the collective (macro) to benefit. Thus construed, there 
must be some element of self-sacrifice to facilitate individual autonomy and 
assumed freedom thereby becoming secondary to collective salvation. Only then 
one’s rights and desires will result in the incapability of violation of others.  
Not only does Coetzee’s protagonist struggle with the difference between 
these psycho-philosophical abstractions and embedded realities, his impasse is 
also simply an allegory which allows Coetzee to represent the moral and political 
paradoxes of all imperial and post-imperial projects. As stated before, Disgrace is 
deeply embedded in the historical realities of post-apartheid South Africa and the 
complex collision between the spheres as discussed before. To navigate this, the 
characters must deal with “rights of desire”, and its complex interweaving with 
the collective guilt of the past and horrors of the present. 
Self-realization and self-reinvention are certainly necessary for the anti-
hero to atone for his disgrace. At times, however, Coetzee suggests that this can 
only occur if the political structure delves deeply and touches our personal self.  
For Lurie, this odyssey and crisis of conscience come after his retreat to Lucy’s 
farm. Long after vehemently refusing to confess to the school board, David makes 
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a significant apology to Melanie’s father: “I apologize for the grief I have caused 
you and Mrs. Isaacs. I ask for your pardon” (171). Public forgiveness and 
confession – former alien concepts for the disciple of Eros - are now inexorably 
linked to private sex. Here, readers can now sympathize with the egocentric and 
emasculated professor who has “solved the problem of sex very well” (1) and has 
“god acting through him” (89). However, the protagonist’s earlier refusal to 
accept the public- styled penitence and atonement on the academic committee’s 
terms, brings him to now confront his real disgrace -- his attack and subsequent 
paralysis to control his situation or Lucy’s. By doing this, Coetzee shapes sex as a 
trope to demonstrate the ambiguity between the most private yet public parts of 
human relations. 
The confession to Mr. Isaacs dramatizes Lurie’s confrontation with his 
own metamorphosis and his effort to amend his life as well as the other “hardest 
part[s] of his body” (2), his temperament. The quasi-religious absolution of the 
committee posed severe limitations, but Lurie confronts Christianity within the 
Isaac’s home as part of his penance. Pamela Cooper10 observes that this can be 
seen as the demise of white advantage wherein Lurie tests and realizes the 
“continuous redrawing and inflaming of the line between the personal conduct 
and public implication” (25). Lurie faces an implied parallel between Melanie’s 
sexual coercion and Lucy’s violation and is apparently coming to terms with his 
weakened sexual control or impotent experience. Indeed, his yearning for 
                                                           
10 Pamela Cooper. “Metamorphosis and Sexuality: Reading the Strange Passions of Disgrace.” 
Research in African Literatures. 36:4 (2005). 22- 39. 
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transcendence informs Lurie self-abasing act of atonement before Melanie’s 
family.  
It is here that the author carefully negotiates the ambivalent questions 
about power and agency and opens up the novel to a deeper spiritual dimension. 
However, this opening does not come through reason and intellect as readers have 
come to expect from Professor Lurie’s philosophical musings. Rather, it 
seemingly erupts from a crisis of self. Mr. Isaacs asks Lurie: “The question is, 
what does God want from you besides being very sorry? Have you any ideas, Mr. 
Lurie?” (172) Nevertheless, Lurie responds that, he is “not a believer”, and that he 
will “have to translate…God and God’s wishes” into his own terms” (172). At 
this point, David Lurie is a sympathetic character and achieves the heights of self-
forfeiture in order to reach self-consolidation discussed before. He is accepting 
that in his fall “into a state of disgrace”, he does not have to refuse the 
punishment, but rather can liv[e] it out day to day, trying to accept disgrace” 
(172). 
The spiritual lens identifies this atonement as a pragmatic, political act in 
that it interprets this confession as a kind of internal compulsion and the tool of 
new social patterns struggling into being. This is where Lurie’s spirit can be seen 
as “reconfigured but not undermined” (Cooper 29). By revising the trope of 
human/divine conjunction, the political becomes enmeshed with the 
spiritual/personal desire. Significantly, Mr. Isaacs explains to David that 
punishment may not be “enough for God” (172), and as David is having a crisis of 
conscience, he further remarks: “I don’t know Mr. Lurie. Normally, I would say, 
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don’t ask me, ask God. But since you don’t pray, you have no way to ask God” 
(172). Hence the suggestion is that Mr. Isaacs has to be the intercessor between 
Lurie’s private self/conscience and his public reparation to the divine. Again, this 
provides an allegorical frame for the TRC, whose secular role becomes religious 
while it mediates on behalf of the perpetrators of apartheid. 
 Coetzee suggests some kind of self-reinvention, but irresolution for 
Lurie’s private, sexual desire here. Did Lurie truly get a public purgation or 
catharsis akin to what the academic inquiry had intended with its packaged 
confession? Readers cannot be sure. From a religious perspective, Melanie’s 
father contends that contrition should not be used as a self-justifying action and 
can only be given validity/recognition based on its consequent actions. 
Nevertheless, Lurie in deep rhetorical repentance wrestles with issues of his 
“rights of desire” for Melanie’s younger sister: 
With careful ceremony, he gets to his knees and touches his 
forehead to the floor. Is that enough? He thinks. Will that do? If 
not, what more? He raises his head. The two of them are sitting 
there, frozen. He meets the mother’s eyes, then the daughter’s and 
again the current leaps, the current of desires. (173) 
 
The implication is that Lurie is moving towards accepting personal 
responsibility, but has not totally achieved self-immersion, which is the path to 
collective salvation and self-affirmation that have been mentioned before. The 
issue becomes more layered because as he remains still an outsider, much later -- 
experientially rather than temporally-- Professor Lurie indulges in one last 
voyeuristic act of spying on Melanie’s performance before he relinquishes 
control. There is no clear indication here whether this act of “giving up, like a 
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dog” (205) stems from the subsequent threat by Melanie’s young lover or from 
David’s self maturation and self forfeiture. What is clear however, is that in both 
cases, primarily sexual relationships, unfathomable, unofficially tolerated but 
morally ambiguous, are forced into the open social world (public) through 
recklessness and for disdain for public convention. 
 Paradoxically, the religious-inflected moralism and the “cross of 
righteousness” (40) that Lurie despised from the committee earlier, has compelled 
him to this self “abatement” he “had been thinking about […] for some time” 
(173).  Although this kind of confession is not as infinitely regressive as the 
artificial one demanded by the committee, Coetzee remains skeptical about its end 
result. He posits that confession should involve the “self [which] cannot tell the 
truth of itself and come to the rest without the possibility of self-deception…true 
confession does not come from the dialogue with its self- doubt, but […] from 
faith and grace” (Doubling 291). Similarly, Michael Marais11contends that this 
release is determined by a tension between the [personal] desire and [public] 
responsibility. Consequently, there is a complex interweaving of confession and 
absolution when there is the overriding force of personal, sexual desire. In this 
case, and as a result of this tension between public and private absolution, the 
latter triumphs. 
How do all these deeper tensions resonate and fit neatly in a transitional 
South Africa? Coetzee takes his biggest risk to date and shows that there is no 
                                                           
11 See Michael Marais work on Coetzee’s concern for the Other to be treated with respect and 
responsibility in “Little Enough, Less Than Little”: Ethics, Engagement and Change in the Fiction 
of J.M. Coetzee. Modern Fiction Studies. 46.1 (2000). 159-182. 
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orderly way to resolve these conflicts – conflicts that are expected in transitional 
societies. Set in post-apartheid South Africa, Coetzee’s Disgrace probes into the 
lives of characters whose lives are conditioned by the historical divide between 
colonizing and colonized peoples. This history collides in a new South Africa in 
1994 after the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) hearings and the newly installed 
legislation -- a legislation that had risky political and social consequences. It is 
this risk that permeates Coetzee’s work as he takes it a step further with the way 
he displaces the authority of historical categories of race, class, and gender. What 
emerges is a modification of South African Literature, one that Poyner12 argues 
influences governmental issues and laws. With this reality, she states that “post 
apartheid fiction reveals that the private can serve as a corrective to the public 
[and suggests] that ‘the dichotomies’ of public/private, political/ethical need 
reconceptualizing” (Poyner 105). Reconceptualization here means that it is indeed 
necessary to change what belongs in the private as opposed to the public spheres 
so that both can be utilized as veritable tools to evaluate events and effect 
changes. The private quest for identity, truth, and healing are inevitable lenses and 
tools to view and re establish South Africa’s public identity. Furthermore, Poyner 
opines that this new ‘order’ is a time in which the private proliferates over the 
public self and self-reflection is necessary. Thus there is more room and space for 
private matters and confessions and less political censure. It is consequently safe 
to state that the tensions unleashed by David’s odyssey for truth and confession, 
and Lucy’s unquestioning acceptance of South Africa’s new realities are largely 
                                                           
12 Jane Poyner. “Writing Under Pressure: A Post Apartheid Canon?” Journal of Post Colonial 
Writing. nr.2 (103-105). 
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determined and conditioned by South African historical legacy, and as such, a 
kind of re conceptualizing of dichotomies that Poyner posits. 
This political-historical frontier, where the text is situated, pits characters 
against each other on the basis of gender, race, and class. Analogously, the TRC 
project unearthed complex issues of catharsis borne differently by male and 
female citizens, whites and blacks, perpetrators and victims, and powerful elites 
and the subjugated majority. The site where the residues of the past seem to be 
firmly grounded sets the stage for the most blatant commensurability with the 
novel’s chief protagonist -- David Lurie. He is recalcitrant and refuses to yield to 
public/political authority even as change envelops him and drives him to the 
edges of society. “I am not prepared to be reformed. I want to go on being 
myself” (77), he obstinately argues.  
This provocative and anachronistic move is where Coetzee is highly 
productive in his critique of the country’s new space. Race relations and remnants 
of the old dispensation and desires of the new will be most entangled. How can 
these be reconciled? Coetzee offers no clear-cut response and questions the 
veritable reformation of the people of South Africa’s mixed races when their true 
desires are to remain refractory. How do the rights and self-entitlement of the 
privileged races translate into a transnational period where those rights are no 
longer written in law? Again, Coetzee demonstrates that this is where the 
complications of the past resonate, not at the political center, as symbolic and 
half-hearted resolutions are available there. 
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Disgrace, then, is asking readers to contemplate whether healing is 
possible under circumstances where people only accept guilt and publicly confess, 
and whether rampant individualism incurs no necessary cost to others. In the 
socio-political context, Disgrace’s characters and plot evolution mirror the 
situation within the post-apartheid context of redefining the South African nation. 
Lurie refers to his inquisition as forged by “gossip-mills, he thinks, turning day 
and night, grinding reputations” (42) analogously as the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s (TRC) highly sensationalized and comprehensive media coverage.  
As such, Coetzee draws an anxious, comfortless picture of post apartheid 
South Africa. Lurie is also representative of an older, social order that is officially 
defunct of Afrikaner dominance, statutory racial oppression, and uneasy white 
privilege. But can this newer order last? Coetzee seems to be ambivalent in his 
response. Change manifests itself for Lurie in sexual terms – first as a perpetrator 
then as victim. Both processes are underpinned with desire, and in doing so, the 
author engages the complex, social relations of the new South Africa though the 
trope of sexuality. Moreover, as an allegorical frame for the TRC, Disgrace 
illustrates a multifaceted comingling of insiders and outsiders in its portrayal of 
how characters tailor the political and ethical trajectories for individualistic 
pursuits. The demarcations that they wish to institute are exactly the ones they 
seek to undermine. 
 Furthermore, the author depicts Lucy’s attack as an untold nationalist 
narrative as a way to mirror how the new South Africa’s encounter with a new 
constitution and its controversial TRC, which in  their interrelated ways postulate 
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dominant nationalist discourses based on truth telling, reconciliation and 
suspension of revenge. David’s committee’s inquisition, for instance, is an overt 
satire on the aims and practices of the TRC’s hearings. David and his daughter 
hold diametric views about the appropriateness of legal remedy, but undergo 
reversals in response to the second crime. But it is clear they are both suspicious 
that public testimony is liberating and that the defense of individual rights should 
be kept in a small private sphere (with the exception of David’s victimization). By 
refusing to publicize her crime, Lucy is also a displaying her unwillingness to let 
the authorities “usurp upon” her pain and, the episode yields the conclusion that 
by insisting on her privacy, Lucy is acting “on a refusal and an introversion of 
retributive violence” (Graham, 5). Consequently, Coetzee implies that the law 
does not necessarily play a determinate role in advancing justice and effectuating 
social restoration. The suggestion then is that there is a need for tempering and 
modifying our own expectations for social justice. 
 Coetzee seems to agree that if confessions and healing are extracted this 
way, they become a shimmering mirage and depicts it through Lurie’s rejection of 
the Committee’s pardon, which also points to the inquisition’s inability to address 
the deeper, more fundamental issues that centers on notions of amnesty and 
revenge. The fact that one confesses but does so with no remorse lends itself to 
the persistence of unsettling revenge instead of unwittingly encouraging social 
and cultural amnesia. This kind of self-conscious confession is also infinitely 
regressive and becomes an end in itself. In another forum, Coetzee comments on 
the nature of this kind of confession as one which involves “the self [which] 
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cannot tell the truth of itself to itself and come to rest without the possibility of 
self-deception. True confession does not come from the sterile monologue of the 
self or from the dialogue with its own self doubt, but…from faith and grace” 
(Coetzee, Doubling  291).  
Lurie’s body (self) is strongly linked to power and desire and ultimately 
disgrace. It is through his exercise of social power and authority that he satisfies 
his sexual desires with Melanie, but he would suffer from that unsettling denial 
and self-deceit if he had publicly accepted culpability without genuine regret. 
Lucy’s rape is also an exercise of power by the new power brokers in South 
Africa. Juxtaposed alongside the TRC, Lurie’s process of reconciliation excludes 
remorse; hence, it makes it difficult to measure sincerity. Like David’s refusal of 
an empty confession, the failed attempts of the TRC illustrate that there is no easy 
redemption or sincere expression of apology if the self/body and heart still have 
individualistic desires. David’s penitence and desire to “speak his mind”, for 
instance, cannot be achieved because of his own selfish sexual “current of desire” 
(173) he experiences when he meets Desiree’s eyes. While making amends for his 
violation of Melanie, his heart is aflame with lust for her sister. It is this inner 
recalcitrance and awareness of unsettling desires that cause Lurie’s (and by 
extension, the South African society) confessions and absolution to be complex. 
 The clashes between public and private lives in Disgrace act as a 
trajectory towards accepting responsibility and the possibility of reconciliation 
and renewal. Coetzee engages this metamorphism through sexuality, but in an 
ambiguous way, for the wider historical changes that are registered in South 
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Africa. By utilizing this strategy, Coetzee tests the fluid boundaries between good 
and evil; private and public; and enfranchisement and disenfranchisement. This 
facilitates an opening of a realm of sociopolitical resonances that discourage an 
easy moral reaction to male desire and otherness entrenched within the Anglo-
European aesthetic tradition. In the novel’s depiction of a reshaped, Africanist 
patriarchy, desire and sexuality unveil whiteness as alienated and the native white 
man as internal exile.  
But what visions are offered here for the new South Africa? Again, 
Coetzee does not give a clear response. Disgrace offers a dark depiction of South 
Africa’s transitional tremors, and in the tradition of post imperial projects, a 
complicated path to reconciliation. Unlike other political fictions that deal with 
post colonialism and offer some kind of conditionality to resolution, Coetzee 
suggests no clear mode in Disgrace and extends a depiction of how the past 
cannot be forgotten if responsibility is not affixed to actions. It is precisely this air 
of contingency and disquiet that is both the novel’s strength and weakness and 
engenders its social and political force. In allowing characters to express their 
“rights of desire”, power relations through sex, and rights to privacy, Coetzee 
depicts how postcolonial violence and its historical implications can shift or 
elucidate the way rights based theories of justice structure human interactions, 
politically and socially.  
Although the novel offers no axiomatic ethical solution, it offers a frame 
that can serve as a prescriptive to the many dangers that accompany human rights 
when they are employed in the negotiation of social justice. Consequently, the 
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repercussions of the trajectory of a public/private dichotomy in Disgrace are 
multiform and ubiquitous.  Furthermore, the fluid nature of the relationship 
between both, for Coetzee, represents antithetical, multi-layered forces, being tied 
simultaneously to the darker, corrosive aspects of human nature. 
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